Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 59

Issue 3

Article 5

June 1983

Llimits on Legislative Court Judicial Power: The Need for
Balancing Competing Interests - Northern Pipeline Construction
Company v. Marathon Pipeline Company
Kenneth T. Kristl

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kenneth T. Kristl, Llimits on Legislative Court Judicial Power: The Need for Balancing Competing Interests
- Northern Pipeline Construction Company v. Marathon Pipeline Company , 59 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 873
(1983).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol59/iss3/5

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

LIMITS ON LEGISLATIVE COURT JUDICIAL POWER: THE
NEED FOR BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS
Northern Pipeline Construction Company v.
Marathon Ppeline Company
102 S.Ct. 2858 (1982)
KENNETH

T.

KRISTL,

1984*

Article III of the Constitution grants Congress the power to create
inferior federal courts,' often called article III, or "constitutional,"
courts. 2 They are staffed by judges with life tenure3 and guaranteed
salaries.4 However, Congress also has the authority, based on other,
non-article III grants of power, to create "legislative" courts--courts
under Congressional control and not subject to article III's limitations.5
Both constitutional and legislative courts have been said to exercise
"judicial power," 6 and the relationship between the judicial powers
vested in these two different kinds of courts has confused court and
scholar alike.7 That confusion confounded Congress as it attempted to
* B.A., University of Notre Dame, 1981; Candidate for J.D., lIT/Chicago-Kent College of
Law, 1984.
1. Section 1 of article III reads:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
2. The terms "constitutional" and "legislative" courts were coined by Chief Justice Marshall
in American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511 (1828). Marshall apparently distinguished them by the source of their powers--constitutional courts deriving their powers from
article Ill, and legislative courts from Congress' ability to create the court as a necessary and
proper means to carry out some power given it in the Constitution.
3. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. I1,16 (1955). Although article III, § 1,
only states that the judges are to hold their office "during good behavior," this clause has been
taken to mean that the tenure of an article III judge is for life.
4. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1.See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980). The salaries are
guaranteed in the sense that a judge's salary cannot be diminished during his or her term in office.
5. Comment, The Distinction Between Legislative and Constitutional Courts and its Effect on
JudicialAssignment, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 133 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Assignment].
These non-article III grants of power are generally found in article I, § 8, which enumerates many
of Congress' legislative powers. However, other sections of the Constitution have been used to
justify legislative courts. Article IV, § 3, for example, was used to justify the creation of territorial
courts. See infra notes 26-29, and text accompanying.
6. Judicial Assignment, supra note 5, at 138.
7. In response to a request for his opinion of the case law on the subject, a law professor
wrote: "[Tihe Supreme Court has made such a mess of this phase of the law that medieval theologians would be as reliable a source of guidance on it as modem professors." Letter of Professor
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reform the bankruptcy laws,8 and the result of that reform effort-the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 9-- created legislative courts with the
judicial power proposed for a constitutional court.
Northern Ppeline Construction Company v. Marathon Ppe/ine
Company' 0 was the Supreme Court's analysis of the constitutionality of
the bankruptcy courts' broad powers. Marathon Ppeline effectively
perpetuated the historical confusion surrounding legislative court judicial power by failing to enunciate one view of that power that could
command a majority of the court. Nor could the Court agree on a
methodology for defining that power; instead, two competing methods
of analyzing the limits of legislative court judicial power were proposed. The Court ultimately rejected the judicial power of the bankruptcy courts on the basis of one method, which viewed article III
policy concerns as limiting legislative court judicial power to three narrow situations." The second method, which balanced the constitutional interests involved, was used by the dissent to conclude that the
12
bankruptcy courts' judicial power is valid.
This comment will examine the history of the doctrines concerning
legislative court judicial power, and how those doctrines were applied
in creating the bankruptcy courts. The MarathonPpeline decision will
be summarized, and each of its four opinions will be discussed. Finally, this comment will analyze Marathon Ppeline both from the
viewpoint of the methodology used to reach the decision, and from the
result itself. It will conclude that the only method capable of achieving
adequate consideration of all issues involved in the decision to bestow
legislative court judicial power is the balancing method of the dissent,
and this method will be used to criticize the final result of the decision.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The constitutional courts established under article III of the Con13
stitution are subject to the salary and tenure provisions of section l,
and the subject matter jurisdiction provisions of section 2.14 These limCharles A. Wright to Representative Peter Rodino, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 595. 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 87 (1977) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
8. See I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
2.01 (15th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER

(15th)].
9. II U.S.C. § 101 el seq. (Supp. 11 1978).
10. 102 S.Ct. 2858 (1982).
II. Id. at 2867-2874. See infra notes 121-125, and accompanying text.
12. Id. at 2893-2896.

13. See supra note I.
14. § 2 extends the judicial power of the United States to
all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
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itations on the judicial power of the United States resulted from the
keen desire of the Framers of the Constitution to separate the powers of
the three branches of the federal government so as to avoid the tyranny
of a concentration of power,' 5 while structuring the powers of each
branch so that its operation would act to confine the other branches
within their proper spheres.' 6 The salary and tenure provisions were
included in article III to insure that the judiciary would be immune to
pressure from the executive and legislative branches, so that "inflexible
and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of indi7
viduals, which we perceive to be indispensible in the courts of justice"'
would be guaranteed.' 8 The most common examples of constitutional
courts are the district courts and the Courts of Appeals.
Despite the apparent exclusivity of the article III grant of the judicial power, Congress has successfully established legislative courts that
exercise judicial power under constitutional auspices other than article
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; --to all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; --to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction; --to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party; -- to Controversies between two or more States; -between a State and Citizens of
another State; -between Citizens of different States; -- between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
15. "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47 at 300 (. Madison) (H.
Lodge ed. 1888).
16. Note, Article III Limits on Article I Courts. The Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Court
and the 1979 Magistrate Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 560, 580 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Article III
Limits]. See Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at 489 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888).
18. With regard to the tenure provisions, Hamilton argued that judicial independence could
never be maintained by a system that did not give its judges permanent commissions.
Periodic appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way
or other, be fatal to [judges'] necessary independence. If the power of making them was
committed either to the Executive or the legislature, there would be danger of an improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to both, there would be an
unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either; if to the people, or to persons chosen by
them for the special purpose, there would be too great a disposition to consult popularity,
to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the laws.
Id. at 489.
With respect to the salary provision, Hamilton believed that
[N]ext to permanancy in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the
judges than a fixed provision for their support . . . In the general course of human
nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will. And we can
never hope to see realized in practise, the complete separation of the judicial from the
legislative power, in any system which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary resources on the occasional grants of the latter.
THE FEDERALIST No. 79 at 491 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge, ed. 1888) (emphasis in original). See
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218-221 (1980); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516,
531 (1933). See generally Article III Limits, supra note 16, at 582-85.
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III. For example, Congress' article IV powers over territories of the
United States were sufficient constitutional justification for creating
such legislative courts as the Court of Private Land Claims, which was
established to hear disputes about lands ceded under a treaty with
Mexico, t9 and the Choctow and Chickesaw Citizenship Court, established to adjudicate claims of Indian citizenship on certain Indian
lands. 20 The general federal power to make treaties with foreign countries was considered sufficient justification for the creation of consular
courts, which adjudicated claims against American citizens in foreign
countries. 21 In general, the salary and tenure of the judges presiding
over legislative courts are subject to Congressional control, and the
subject matter jurisdiction of these tribunals may include legislative
and administrative tasks that could not be performed by constitutional
22

courts.

Given the Framers' concern for judicial independence and the separation of powers among the governmental branches, there must be
some essential difference between constitutional courts, whose power is
defined by article III and is thus immune from legislative interference,
and legislative courts, whose power is defined by Congress and is thus
continually exposed to legislative interference. Article III vests the "judicial power of the United States" in the constitutional courts; assuming that article III exclusively defines the repositories of that judicial
power, the power of a legislative court to adjudicate must be some
other kind of judicial power. Thus, the essential difference between
constitutional and legislative courts is the difference in the power each
can constitutionally wield.
Article III, section 2 limits the judicial power of constitutional
courts to the "cases and controversies" outlined in that section, 23 and
the Supreme Court has strictly applied this standard when confronted
with the question of whether a case was properly before a constitutional court. 24 Given this relatively clear definition of the judicial
19. See United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76 (1894).
20. See Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899).
21. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
22. JudicialAssignment,supra note 5, at 138. These courts are justified by the practical flexibility afforded the government when the article III tenure and salary provisions are not rigidly
enforced. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 396 (2d ed. 1973). Some of the practical interests

mentioned on the flexibility of legislative courts include the ability to disband a tribunal once. it
has outlived its usefulness; the ability to hear cases outside article IlI jurisdiction; and the ability
to establish expert tribunals, with the power to change the judges so as to maintain the court's
expertise (for example, the Tax Court). See Article III Limits, supra note 16, at 570-71.
23. See supra note 14.
24. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (article III court
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power of constitutional courts, the difference between it and the power
of legislative courts can best be seen by focusing on the historically
different approaches taken by the Supreme Court toward defining the
judicial power of legislative courts. 2 5
I

HistoricalDefinitions of the Powers of Legislative Courts

The confusing history of the doctrine of legislative courts began in
American Insurance Company v. Canter.26 In 1823, Congress had established a territorial legislature in Florida which had the power to create inferior courts for the territory. The issue in Canter was whether a
judicial sale, held pursuant to an admiralty judgment of a territorial
court, was valid. Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, determined that the territorial court was a legislative court, 27 created by virtue of Congress' enumerated power to make rules and regulations for
the territories. 28 Because the court was created under a provision other
than article III, it neither received its judicial power via that article nor
was subject to its limitations. Yet the legislative court in Canter exercised jurisdiction that clearly fell within the subject matter jurisdiction
of article 111.29 Thus, the policy considerations of judicial independence and separation of powers that are embodied in the salary and
tenure provisions of article III can give way to Congress' power to create courts under other constitutional provisions. 30 The legislative
judgments cannot be subject to executive or legislative review; therefore case subject to such review could not be heard before article Ill courts); Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 277
U.S. 274 (1928) (constitutional court cannot issue a declaratory judgment); Keller v. Potomac
Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923) (constitutional court cannot be required to perform legislative or administrative functions).
25. This comment focuses on the judicial power of legislative courts. The cases to be discussed in this historical analysis focused on two issues: The definition of the type of court
(whether the court in question was legislative or constitutional), and the powers that legislative
and constitutional courts possess. Because the bankruptcy court involved in Marathon Pipeline
was clearly not a constitutional court, the issue of type of court is not in dispute. Thus, the following historical analysis is limited to the issue of court power as discussed in previous cases.
26. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511 (1828).
27. These Courts, then, are not constitutional Courts, in which the judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general government, can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative Courts, created in virtue of the general right of
sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables
Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to
the United States.
Id. at 546.
28. Id. Congress' ability to make rules and regulations for the territories is enumerated in
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
29. This was a case in admiralty which is specifically included in the article III § 2 list of
cases and controversies. It was argued in Canter that the case could only be heard by a court
wielding article IIl power (26 U.S. (I Pet.) at 536-37). Marshall, however, was willing to allow
Congress to include admiralty in the territorial court's jurisdiction.
30. The extent of the departure from the salary and tenure provisions allowed in Canter is
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courts thus created could be as powerful as constitutional courts with31
out being limited by the requirements of article III.
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court limited legislative court judicial power to "public rights" cases in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land andImprovement Company. 32 At issue was the ability of a solicitor of the Treasury, a non-article III officer, to issue a warrant for distress 33 and seize the lands of a customs collector. The issuance of the
warrant was considered a judicial act. 34 The question was whether that
judicial act had to be carried out by a constitutional court. The Court
recognized that there are some cases which Congress cannot remove
from the jurisdiction of constitutional courts. Such cases are, by their
nature, subject to article III judicial consideration 35-inherently judicial cases. However,
there are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in
such form that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and
which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which Congress
of the courts of the
may or may not bring within the cognizance
6
United States, as it may deem proper.
The power of the solicitor was upheld because Congress had chosen to
remove this public rights case from the constitutional courts. The policies of article III can thus give way to congressional desire to remove a
public rights case from constitutional courts and to place it within the
jurisdiction of a legislative court. Murray's Lessee limited the broad
legislative court judicial power approved of in Canter by recognizing
the existence of cases reserved to the constitutional courts, while also
made clear by the fact that the court whose decision Marshall upheld consisted of a notary and
five jurors. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) at 541. The notary did not have life tenure in his position on this
court-indeed, the tenure of the judges of the Superior Courts for the territory (the highest court
created) was only for four years. Id. at 546.
31. This ability of legislative court judicial power to circumvent the limitations of article III
has historically been limited to territorial courts, McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 187-88
(1891), apparently on the theory that such disregard for article III was only temporary. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 545-47 (1962); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 53638 (1933).
32. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
33. A warrant for distress is a writ authorizing an officer to seize the property of a wrong-doer
to procure a satisfaction for the wrong committed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 426 (5th Ed. 1979).
The statute at issue in Murray'sLessee granted the solicitor of the Treasury the power to issue a
warrant for distress allowing the seizure of lands of a customs collector if evidence indicated that
the collector had not turned over to the Treasury all monies he had collected. 59 U.S. (18 How.)
at 274-75.
34. 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 280.
withdraw from
35. "We think it proper to state that we do not consider congress can ...
judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at common law, or in
Id. at 284.
equity, or admiralty..
36. Id.
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realizing that article III's concerns can give way in cases involving public rights.
Legislative court judicial power over matters not inherently judicial was expanded in Ex Parte Bakelite Corporation.37 The ability of
the Court of Customs Appeals to hear appeals from the Tariff Commission was challenged by petitioners who argued that the court was a
constitutional court, and so could not hear an appeal that was not a
case or controversy. 38 The Supreme Court declared the Court of Customs Appeals a legislative court, created by virtue of Congress' enumerated power to lay and collect duties on imports. 39 Because the
appeals at issue in Bakelite did not involve inherently judicial matters,
but rather could have been committed to the final determination of an
executive officer, 40 the legislative court could hear and decide the appeals. The policy concerns of article III gave way to the use of the
Court of Customs Appeals not because of congressional desire to remove the appeals from article III judicial consideration, 4 1 but because
the nature of the subject matter in controversy justified the use of legislative court judicial power. This use of the legislative court was justified even though the jurisdiction conferred had formerly been exercised
by the district court. 42 Bakelite thus expanded the limits of legislative
court judicial power to include all non-inherently judicial subject
43
matter.
A different justification for legislative court judicial power arose in
the context of appellate review in Crowell v. Benson .4 At issue was the
45
ability of an agency to make administrative findings of fact. Relying
on historical precedent, the Court held that determinations of fact did
37.

279 U.S. 438 (1929).

38. See Argument for the Petitioner, id. at 439-42.
39. Id. at 458.
40. Id. See Katz, FederalLegislative Courts, 43 HARV. L. REV. 894, 916-17 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Katz].
41. The Court rejected the congressional intent test of Murray's Lessee: "the argument is
fallacious. It mistakenly assumes that whether a court is of one class or the other depends on the
intention of Congress, whereas the true test lies in the power under which the court was created
and in the jurisdiction conferred." 279 U.S. at 459.
42. See Katz, supra note 40, at 896-97.
43. See JudicialAssignment, supra note 5, at 144.
44. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
45. The statute involved was the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (19th ed.)). The Act provided for compensation for disability or death
provided the injury occurs on the "navigable waters of the United States." There must exist the
relation of master and servant between the injured party and the employer from whom compensation is sought, and it must be impossible to recover such compensation through a state workman's
compensation statute. The Act empowered the United States Employee Compensation Commission to determine whether the requirements of the Act (the facts outlined here) were present in
each individual case.
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not have to be made by article III judges. 46 The interesting question
was whether the legislative court (the agency) could make determinations of "jurisdictional" facts. 47 Chief Justice Hughes believed that because the district court had the power to review the finding of fact, the
"essential independence of the exercise of the judicial power of the
United States" 48 could be maintained. Thus, article III considerations
are satisfied when a legislative court's application of law to fact is subject to appellate review. If read broadly, this could expand the limits of
49
legislative court judicial power.
Confusion in the distinction between constitutional and legislative
court judicial power became apparent in National Mutual Insurance
Company v. Tidewater Transfer Company. 50 A congressional act allowing citizens of the District of Columbia to sue in federal district
court on the basis of diversity was upheld. Justice Jackson argued that
while the definition of "state" in article III prevented citizens of the
District from suing, Congress' article I power over the District was sufficient constitutional justification for the Act. 5 1 Jackson attempted to
show a compatibility between article I and article III by showing exam46. The Court cited the historical practice in cases of equity and admiralty of using masters,
commissioners or assessors to make findings of specific facts, such as the amount of damages. 285
U.S. at 51-52. It concluded: "[I1n cases of [private right], there is no requirement that, in order to
maintain the essential attributes of the judicial power, all determinations of fact in constitutional
courts shall be made by judges." Id. at 51.
47. The Court defined jurisdictional facts as those facts the existence of which is "a condition
precedent to the operation of the statutory scheme." Id. at 54. They are facts "upon which the
enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen depend." Id. at 56. Under the statute in
controversy in Crowell, the jurisdictional facts were that the injury did in fact occur upon the
navigable waters of the United States and that the relation of master and servant existed at the
time of the injury. Id. at 54-55. Given this broad definition, it is apparent that whenever a deputy
commissoner made a finding of fact under the Act, he was making a finding of jurisdictional fact
as well.
48. Id. at 64. Because of the broad definition of jurisdictional facts adopted by the Court,
appellate review of the findings of jurisdictional fact is really appellate review of the administrative fact-finding process itself. It thus appears that the court is saying that appellate review of a
legislative court's findings, be they of jurisdictional facts or not, is sufficient protection of the
article III policy concerns about the judicial power of the United States.
49. Such a broad interpretation of Crowell is not universally accepted. In his letter to Peter
Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee considering the bankruptcy laws, Terrance
Sandalow wrote:
To read the [Crowell] decision that way, however, would seem to point toward the conclusion that the salary and tenure provisions of Article III are applicable only to appellate judges, a limitation that finds no support in the language of the Article. . . Crowell
may be read more narrowly, as resting upon the ground that the agency was not authorized to exercise the full range of powers traditionally associated with "the judicial
power.".. .

supra note 7, at 79. Bui see letter of David L. Shapiro, Id. at 83 (Crowell read to
allow legislative courts if adequate appellate review exists).
50. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
51. Id. at 600.
HOUSE REPORT,
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pies of article III courts that exercised article I powers, thus dragging in
the legislative/constitutional court controversy. 52 Six Justices rejected
Jackson's analysis. Justices Rutledge and Murphy argued that constitutional courts cannot be vested with nonarticle III powers without
making the Constitution a "self-contradicting instrument." 53 Chief
Justice Vinson argued in dissent that the powers of legislative and constitutional courts are separate and cannot be intermixed, 54 although
both kinds of courts may sometimes exercise concurrent jurisdiction.
Vinson admitted that such concurrent jurisdiction may lead to the conclusion that the distinction between the two types of courts is "meaningless", 55 although he believed that the distinction was ultimately
grounded in the different constitutional provisions under which each
type of court was established. National Mutual Insurance effectively
confused the definition of constitutional court power by leaving unclear
the question of the source of its power. Likewise, Chief Justice Vinson's dissent raised the question of whether the distinction between the
judicial power of legislative and constitutional courts was
"meaningless".
Without much of an attempt to clarify the distinctions between the
judicial powers, the Court made one further statement concerning the
bounds of legislative court judicial power in Palmorev. UnitedStates.56
A criminal conviction under the congressionally-created District of Co52. Justice Jackson provided two examples to bolster his claim of compatibility. The first
was the Court of Claims, which exercises judicial power derived from the article I power of Congress to pay the debts of the United States. Citing to Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553
(1933), Jackson argued that district courts can hear cases involving claims against the United
States, but can only exercise the same article I power as the Court of Claims. 337 U.S. at 592-93.
The second example used was that of bankruptcy adjudication. Jackson believed that the article I
power to make uniform laws for bankruptcy allowed Congress to "authorize an Art. III court [the
district court] to entertain a non-Art. III suit because such judicial power was conferred under Art.
I." Id. at 595. Jackson's argument thus supported two basic positions: first, that the judicial
power of constitutional courts was not exclusively derived from article IlI, and second, that article
I could be a source of judicial power independent of article III.
53. Id. at 607 (Rutledge, J., concurring). Justice Rutledge took specific exception to Justice
Jackson's analogy to the bankruptcy laws, saying that while article I was the source of the congressional power to pass bankruptcy laws, the jurisdiction exercised by the federal district courts was
conventional federal-question jurisdiction. Id. at 611-15.
54. Id. at 640 (Vinson, C. J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 644.
56. 411 U.S. 389 (1973). While this is the last case analyzed here, it is important to note that
one other case was decided in this area of constitutional law. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530 (1962), involved the definition of legislative courts vis-a-vis constitutional courts, an issue not
directly applicable here. However, it appeared the effect of the decision was to allow Congress to
use constitutional courts to do non-article III work--the very position rejected by the six Justices
in National Mutual Insurance. Thus, the confusion begun in National Mutual Insurance was continued by Glidden, further blurring the distinction between legislative and constitutional courts.
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lumbia Code was challenged as violative of article 111. 5 7 The Court
noted four historical instances where article III controversies are not
decided by an article III judge: enforcement of federal statutes in state
courts; 58 territorial courts; 59 military courts; 60 and other courts using
judges of limited tenure. 6 ' Given this historical analysis, the Court
held that there are situations when the requirements of article III must
give way "to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas having particularized needs and
warranting distinctive treatment. ' 62 Finding that the administration of
the District of Columbia was one such specialized "area", the Court
upheld Palmore's conviction. Thus, legislative court judicial power can
extend to "specialized areas" in which Congress can legislate.
If summary is possible, the doctrine of legislative court judicial
power has historically rested upon a recognition that the provisions of
article III are safeguards of the constitutional separation of powers.
While the policies underlying those provisions are important, they nevertheless have given way to legislative courts in a variety of situations.
Given the confusion caused by the divided court in National Mutual
Iasurance, the limits of legislative court judicial power, as well as its
distinction from constitutional court judicial power, have remained unclear. However, it was clear historically that the provisions of article
III are not absolute regulations on all exercises of judicial power.
II

Bankruptcy Courts and Legislative Court Judicial Power

The Constitution grants Congress the power "to establish . . .
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States."'63 Pursuant to that power, Congress passed four bankruptcy
acts prior to 1978. 64
57. 411 US. at 400. The basic thrust of Palmore's argument was that, because the crime he
was convicted of arose under the laws of the United States, he was entitled to a hearing by an
article III judge. Id.
58. Id. at 401-02.
59. Id. at 402-03.
60. Id. at 404.
61. Id. The Courts specifically mentioned were: The Court of Private Land Claims (see
United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76 (1894)); The Choctow and Chickasaw Citizenship Court (see
Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 455 (1899)); courts created in unincorporated districts
outside the mainland (seeDownes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)); and the Consular Courts established in foreign countries (see In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891)).
62. 411 U.S. at 407-08.
63. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
64. Those laws were: The Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 19, which was repealed in 1803, 2
Stat. 248; The Bankruptcy Act of 1841, 5 Stat. 440, which was repealed in 1843; The Bankruptcy
Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 517, repealed in 1878; and The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544, repealed
in 1979. Because this comment focuses on the judicial power question of the bankruptcy courts,
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The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the historical predecessor to the
present bankruptcy laws. It declared the district courts to be courts of
bankruptcy, 65 presided over by the district court judges and by bankruptcy referees. These referees exercised specific duties 66 subject always to review by a judge. 67 Although the 1898 Act placed the referee
in this subordinate role, the courts viewed the referee as being in the
position of the judge, 68 and "clothed with judicial authority. ' 69 The
referee's broad powers 70 enabled him to decide issues in bankruptcy
proceedings as the district court judge could, provided the parties con7
sented to his adjudication. 1
In 1938, the Chandler Act 72 amended the 1898 Act and significantly increased the powers of the referee to act as the "judicial arm" of
the bankruptcy courts.7 3 The word "court" in the 1898 Act was
amended to include the referee, 74 thus making it clear in the statute
that "in general the functions of the bankruptcy court may be filled by
either a judge or the referee. ' 75 Although still subject to review by the
district court judge, the decisions and orders of referees, if not appealed
within the time prescribed, had the same force and effect as orders of
the legislative history here is necessarily limited. For a complete history of the previous bankruptcy acts, as well as an extensive analysis of the legislative history of the 1878 Act, see COLLIER
(15th), supra note 8
1.01-1.03; Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DE
PAUL L. REV. 941 (1979).

65. 30 Stat. 544, § 1.
66. The office of referee was created by § 34 of the 1898 Act. § 38 listed the jurisdiction of
the referees as including jurisdiction to I) adjudicate petitions referred to them; 2) administer
oaths and examine documents; 3) exercise the power of a judge to take and release possession of
debtor's property; 4) perform duties conferred on the bankruptcy court; and 5) authorize stenographers to transcribe the proceedings. § 39 defined the duties of the referees as including 1) declaring dividends; 2) examining schedules of property for sufficiency; 3) furnishing requested
information to parties; 4) giving notice to creditors; 5) making records of the proceedings; 6) filing
schedules of property; 7) transmitting needed papers to the court; 8) preserve evidence; and 9) obtaining papers filed in court. 1d.
67. Id. at § 38.
68. In re Guaranty Trust Co., 25 F. Supp. 265 (D. Ore. 1938).
69. In re Mclntire, 142 F. 593, 596 (N.D.W. Va. 1906). See White v. Schloerb, 178 U.S. 542
(1900) (referee "exercises much of the judicial authority of [the bankruptcy] court").
70. The referee is not the court of bankruptcy, but an officer of it. He has such powers as
the act and the order of reference give him or as the judge specially delegates to him
. . . these powers, however, are so broad that the act declares that in its provisions the
word 'court' may include the referee.
Chandler v. Perry, 74 F.2d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 1934).
71. MacDonald v. Plymouth County Trust Co., 286 U.S. 263 (1932); Page v. Arkansas Natural Gas. Corp., 286 U.S. 269 (1932).
72. Act of June 22, 1938, 52 Stat. 840.
73. COLLIER (15th), supra note 8, 1.02(2).
74. Under the 1938 amendments, the definition of "court" was "the judge or the referee of
the court of bankruptcy in which the proceedings are pending." Under the 1898 Act before the
Chandler Act amendments, the referee "may" be included in the definition of "court", but did not
have to be included. I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCy
1.09, at 64 (14th ed. 1976).
75. Id.
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the district court, 7 6 and were entitled to the same respect and credit as if
rendered by any court of general jurisdiction. 77 It was thus evident that
after a case was referred to the referee, he possessed "complete jurisdiction" 78 over the proceedings.
In 1973, the Supreme Court promulgated the Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, 79 which further emphasized the role of the referee in bankruptcy court proceedings. The Rules gave the title of "bankruptcy
judge" to the referee, 80 thus officially recognizing the judicial status of
the referee as a "regular judicial officer that handles only bankruptcy
cases."'' S All bankruptcy petitions were to be referred to the referee/judge by the clerk of the court, 82 thus making the referee/judge the
conduit through which all bankruptcy litigation must pass. The increasing responsibility of the referee/judge was thus made apparent by
the Supreme Court.
The net effect of both the 1938 amendments and the Bankruptcy
Rules was to create a defacto independent bankruptcy judiciary 83 comprised of referee/judges that operated independently of the district
court judges. As the number and complexity of bankruptcy cases increased, the specialization needed to deal with those cases became too
great a burden for district court judges to handle. 84 Thus, "the district
courts allowed and encouraged the bankruptcy court's evolution towards independence, ' 85 while the district court judges "removed themselves further and further from the consideration of bankruptcy
matters."' 86 However, this independence of the referee/judges was not
complete. The bankruptcy judges were subject to appointment and removal by the district court judges, and in that sense remained depen87
dent upon the district court for their power.
76.

2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

77. Id. at 1402-03.
78. I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
79. 415 U.S. 1003 (1973).
80. Bankruptcy Rule 901(7).

38.02, at 1399 (14th ed. 1978).
1.09, at 65 (14th ed. 1976).

81.

HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.

82.

Bankruptcy Rule 102.

83. Eisen & Smrtnik, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978--.An Elevated Judiciary, 28
DEPAUL L. REV. 1007 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Eisen].
84. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.

85.

Eisen, supra note 83, at 1009.

86.

HOUSE REPORT. supra note 7, at 9.

87. § 34 of the 1898 Act empowered the district court to appoint and remove referees. 52
Stat. 840, § 34. The power to appoint and remove, to hear appeals of referee/judge's decisions,
and the exercise of certain powers reserved to the district court by statute were the only powers
that the district court retained as the bankruptcy system continued to evolve towards independence. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
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The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197888 restructured the bankruptcy judicial system to handle the increased burden on the system
caused by an increasing number of bankruptcy cases. 89 Despite the de
facto independence that bankruptcy judges already enjoyed, the Act
sought to establish truly independent bankruptcy courts so as to end
the real and apparent dependence on the district courts. 90 To this end,
the 1978 Act created United States Bankruptcy Courts in each judicial
district as adjuncts to the district court. 9 1 Jurisdiction was expanded to
include all "civil proceedings arising under Title 11 [the new Bankruptcy Code] or arising in or related to cases under Title 11 ,"' 92 thus
giving the bankruptcy courts the power to hear claims based on state as
well as federal law. 93 The new bankruptcy judges were appointed to
fourteen-year terms, 94 with salaries subject to adjustment. 9 5 These
judges replaced the referee/judges, and exercised all the "powers of a
court of equity, law and admiralty." 96 The judgments and orders of the
court were subject to ultimate appellate review by the court of
97
appeals.
The nature of the judicial power to be exercised by the new bankruptcy courts was an issue of contention throughout the legislative process that created them, indicating the confusion in the then current
view of legislative court judicial power. 9 8 Three basic proposals
evolved, all based on different interpretations of the Supreme Court
precedents: the first, that the bankruptcy courts would exercise judicial
power derived from article I, and thus be legislative courts (the legisla88. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, il U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1976,
Supp. I11).
1.03. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, chapter 1.
89. COLLIER (15th), supra note 8
90. SEN. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Congress, 2d Sess. 6 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as SENATE
REPORT].

91. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. 111 1979).
92. Id. § 1471(b). Although § 1471(a) initially vests this jurisdiction in the district court,
§ 1471(c) gives the bankruptcy court the ability to exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred on the
district court.
3.01 at 3-47 to 3-48.
93. See COLLIER (15th), supra note 8,
94. 28 U.S.C. § 153 (Supp. I1 1979).

95. Id. § 154.
96. Id. § 1481. The court could not, however, enjoin another court or punish a criminal
contempt not committed in the presence of the judge of the court or warranting a punishment of
imprisonment. In addition, the bankruptcy judges could hold jury trials (28 U.S.C. § 1480); issue
declaratory judgments (28 U.S.C. § 2201); issue writs of habeus corpus (28 U.S.C. § 2256); and
issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
the Code (II U.S.C. § 105(a)).
97. To handle appeals from orders of a bankruptcy court, the 1978 Act allows for panels of
three bankruptcy judges (or if no panel is chosen by the Chief Justice of the Circuit council, then
the district court) to hear the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1482. The court of appeals has jurisdiction over
appeals from the panel or district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1293.
98. See supra note 7.
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tive court position); 99 the second, that the bankruptcy courts would exercise article III judicial power, and thus be constitutional courts (the
constitutional court position); t°° and lastly, that the bankruptcy courts
would exercise district court judicial power as adjuncts to the district
courts (the adjunct court position).' 0 ' The debate on these proposals
was extensive, 0 2 and the final bill passed by both houses of Congress
was the ultimate in political compromise: it combined the limited-term
judges of the legislative court position with the extensive powers advocated in the constitutional court position, and called the combination
an adjunct to the district court. 0 3 The result was a legislative court
exercising broad judicial power that included the power to hear article
III cases and controveries.
The reactions to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 were mixed.
Some legal commentators praised the new Act for the independence it
99. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, formed by Congress to
analyze the bankruptcy laws and recommend changes (Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354,
84 Stat. 468), issued its report in 1973 recommending that the bankruptcy courts be set up with
judges appointed to fifteen-year terms. Although this in effect was a legislative court, the Commission did not give it such a designation, nor did it attempt to categorize the court as legislative
or constitutional because the Commission believed that Congress' power to create the courts under
article l's grant of authority to make laws of bankruptcy was clear. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 9192 (1973). The model for the proposed bankruptcy court was the Tax Court, which had long been
viewed as a legislative court properly created under the article I power of Congress to lay and
collect taxes. See Burns, Stix Friedman & Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 392 (1971).
Chairman Peter Rodino of the House Judiciary Committee drafted a letter that he sent to
several attorneys and professors asking for their opinion on the constitutionality of the Commission's proposal. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 63-65. Three respondents believed that Congress could create the bankruptcy courts as legislative courts. See id. at 66-69 (letter of Erwin N.
Griswold); at 78-82 (letter of Professor Terrance Sandalow); and at 82-85 (letter of David L. Shapiro). In particular, Erwin Griswold believed that the Palmore decision left "no real basis for a
valid constitutional doubt" that the judicial power exercised by limited-tenure bankruptcy judges
would be proper. Letter of Erwin N. Griswold, id. at 67.
100. This position was taken by the Staff of the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary. See STAFF OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, CONSTITU-

(Comm. Print No. 3, 1977). This was also the position taken in the
House version of the 1978 Act. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, which contains an extensive
analysis of the case law concerning legislative court judicial power. Finally, three of the respondents to Chairman Rodino's letter took this position. Id. at 65-66 (letter of Brice M. Clagett); at
69-72 (letter of Professor Thomas G. Krattenmaker); and at 77-78 (letter of Professor Paul
Mishkin).
101. This position was adopted in the Senate's version of the 1978 Act. See SENATE REPORT,
supra note 90, at 16. One of the advantages of this approach specifically enumerated by the
Senate Report was that "[clertain perceived constitutional impediments to the exercise of the judicial power of the United States by non-tenured judges are thus eliminated." Id.
102. See 123 CONG. REC. H 35,444 (Oct. 27, 1977).
103. Note the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. III 1979). The full jurisdiction of the district court is vested in the bankruptcy court (§ 147 1(c)), although the court itself is an "adjunct" to
the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 15 1(a). But because the judges have limited tenure, the court
must be a legislative court.
TIONAL BANKRUPTCY COURTS
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granted to the bankruptcy judges and the formal recognition it gave to
the defacto independence that had existed for a long time. °4 Other
commentators argued that the Act was unconstitutional because it violated the policy considerations embodied in the salary and tenure provisions of article 111.105 Likewise, the two courts that dealt with the
constitutional issues of the 1978 Act split on the issue of the constitutional propriety of the bankruptcy courts' judicial power.
The bankruptcy court for the District of Puerto Rico upheld the
constitutionality of the 1978 Act in Segarra v. Banco Central Y
Economias (In re Segarra).1°6 Bankrupt debtors had brought suit
against a bank, seeking damages for alleged improper acts by the bank.
The bank argued that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to hear
the case because the judicial power granted the court under the 1978
Act could only be constitutionally exercised by a constitutional court
subject to article III. The judge rejected the bank's argument, finding
that "[wihen Congress creates an Article I Court, it has no such [tenure]
restriction on it, and the judges of an Art. I Court may be tenured or
not as Congress deems appropriate."'' 0 7 Relying heavily on Bakelite,
the judge argued that tenure does not "carry with it some magical property whereby the recipient is transfigured into a more perfect jurist;" 0 8
citing the historical facts that non-tenured territorial judges and nontenured state court judges have been allowed to hear and determine
cases involving federally-created rights, 10 9 the court upheld the constitutionality of the 1978 Act. 0
The 1978 Act was declared unconstitutional by the bankruptcy
court for the Eastern District of Tennessee in In re Rivers."' Finding
that "the power of Congress to pass a statute on a particular subject
does not mean it is constitutional for Congress to create non-Article III
104. See Eisen, supra note 83; Note, Bankruptcy Reform. A New Judiciary, 48 U. CIN. L. REV.
367 (1979).
105. See Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence.: Why the New Bankruptcy
Courts are Unconstitutional,70 GEO. L. J. 297 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Krattenmaker]; Article
III Limits, supra note 16.
106. 14 B.R. 870 (Bankr. D. Puerto Rico 1981).
107. Id. at 877.
108. Id. at 876.
109. Id. at 877.
110. . . .

Congress, in adopting the Bankruptcy Reform Act .

deprived no litigant

of any constitutionally guaranteed right, and when this legislation is considered in the
light of Congress' concern and deep study of the problem of administering the bankruptcy system . . . we are of the opinion that the presumption of constitutionality of
any Act of Congress is appropriate and sustained in this case.
Id.
I 11. 19 B. R. 438 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
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courts to decide cases arising under the statute," ' 12 the court viewed the
tenure provisions of article III as limits on Congress' power to create
courts. A court need not have tenured judges if the underlying policy
concerns of article III-federalism and separation of powers- were
not violated.' '3 Finding that the judicial power under the 1978 Act was
a broad scale invasion of areas of the law generally subject to state
control (thus violating the federalism concerns of article

111),

14

and

that the 1978 Act impermissably allowed the other branches of government to influence decisions of the court (thus violating the separation
of power concerns of article III), 1 15 the court found no constitutional
6
justification for a non-article III bankruptcy court."1
It was clear that confusion about the constitutionality of the bankruptcy courts' judicial power reigned in the legislative process that created it, the legal literature that interpreted it, and the judicial process
that attempted to exercise it. It was in this setting that Marathon Ppeline came to the Supreme Court.
NORTHERN PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION Co. v
MARA THON PIPELINE CO.

7
The facts of the Marathon Pipeline case are quite simple.'
Northern Pipeline Construction Company ("Northern") filed a petition
for reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court for the district of Minnesota. Pursuant to the 1978 Act, Northern brought an action in the
bankruptcy court against Marathon Pipeline Company ("Marathon"),
seeking damages for breach of contract and warranty, as well as for
misrepresentation, coercion and duress. Marathon moved to dismiss
the suit for lack of jurisdiction over the contract and tort claims, claiming that such jurisdiction involved an exercise of article III judicial
power which the bankruptcy court did not possess. The motion was
denied, but on appeal the District Court granted the motion, holding
that "the delegation of authority in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 to the bankruptcy
judges to try cases otherwise relegated under the Constitution to Article
III judges" was unconstitutional. Appeal was had to the Supreme
Court.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
Court's

Id. at 447.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 450.
Id.
Id.
The lower court proceedings are unrecorded. These facts are a summary based on the
statement of facts. 102 S. Ct. 2864.
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In the Supreme Court, appellants Northern and the United States
defended the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction by arguing, first, that the
bankruptcy courts were properly constituted legislative courts, created
by virtue of Congress' article I power to make bankruptcy laws. The
appellants believed that this power was a plenary grant of power to
legislate in a "specialized area having particularized needs," thus justifying the broad jurisdiction given the bankruptcy courts. Second, the
appellants argued that the bankruptcy courts were simply adjuncts to
the district courts, and thus the policies of article III are protected both
by this adjunct relationship and by the appellate review of article III
8

courts. " 1

The Supreme Court's decision involved four separate opinions:
the plurality opinion of the Court, written by Justice Brennan; a concurring opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist; a dissenting opinion,
written by Chief Justice Burger; and Justice White's dissent. Each
presented a different view of the judicial power of the bankruptcy
courts, and different methodologies were employed in analyzing that
power. The result was that no one view commanded a majority of the
Court.
The Plurality Opinion
19

Justice Brennan
began the plurality opinion by reiterating the
policy justifications behind the tenure and salary provisions of article
III, finding that the Constitution "unambiguously enunciates a fundamental principle-that the 'judicial power of the United States' must be
reposed in an independent judiciary."'' 20 These considerations served
as the constitutional cornerstone of the plurality's analysis of the issues
in the MarathonPipeline case.
The plurality responded to the appellants' claim that the bankruptcy courts were proper legislative courts by noting that the precedents advanced in support of the argument "when properly understood
• . . represent no broad departure from the constitutional command
that the judicial power of the United States must be vested in Art. III
Courts."121 Reading these cases restrictively, Brennan argued that these
precedents merely established three narrow exceptions to the article III
122
policies: territorial courts; military courts; and public rights cases.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 2867.
Justice Brennan was joined in his opinion by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.
102 S. Ct. at 2866.
Id. at 2867.
Id. at 2868.
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The territorial and military court exceptions were justified because
both involved constitutional grants of power historically understood as
giving the political branches of government "extraordinary control
over the precise subject matter at issue."'1 23 Public rights cases were

justified by the non-judicial nature of the subject matter involved.
However, this last exception was limited to a "public" right; cases involving private rights lie at the "core of historically recognized judicial
power." 124 Justice Brennan found none of these three exceptions applicable to the bankruptcy courts.

25

The plurality rejected the appellants' attempt to establish a fourth
exception-specialized courts in "specialized areas having particularized needs." Finding the essence of the argument to be the contention
that, in pursuit of its article I powers, Congress may create "courts free
' 26
of Art. III's requirements whenever it finds that course expedient,"'
Brennan rejected it on the grounds that it contained no limiting principle.127 Without limits on its power to create legislative courts, Congress
could supplant the system of independent article III courts with a system of specialized courts subject to congressional control. Such a rule
of broad legislative discretion could "effectively eviscerate the constitutional guarantee of an independent Judicial Branch of the Federal
28
Government." 1
The appellants' second argument-that the bankruptcy courts are
adjuncts to the district courts-was rejected on article III grounds as
123. Id. at 2869.
124. Id. at 2871. The plurality adopts the definition of a "public" right first articulated in
Bakelite: a matter arising between the government and others. 279 U.S. at 451. Private rights
involve "the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined," quoting Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. at 51.
125. 102 S. Ct. at 2871-72.
126. Id. at 2872.
127. Id. The plurality concedes that the appellants' analysis limits Congress' court-making
ability to specific article I powers, but finds that limit "wholly illusory." Justice Brennan apparently finds the "all matters related to" part of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction troublesome, for
his argument consists of offering the enumerated article I power to regulate interstate commerce
and then noting "[o]n appellant's reasoning Congress could provide for the adjudication of these
and 'related' matters by judges and court within Congress' exclusive control." Id. at 2873.
In a footnote, Justice Brennan made an interesting observation. Noting that the appellants
had relied on Canter and Crowell, he pointed out: "This reliance underscores the fact that appellants offer no principled means of distinguishing between Congress' Art. I powers and any of
Congress' other powers-including, for example, those conferred by the various amendments to
the Constitution . . ." Id. at 2873 n.27. How the plurality can approve of each decision separately, but find no "principled means" of distinguishing constitutional powers, is puzzling.
128. Id. at 2873. The plurality finds the potential for encroachment upon the powers reserved
to the judiciary "dramatically evidenced" in the "related to" jurisdiction granted to the bankruptcy courts. The 1978 Act is offered as proof that "appellants' analysis fails to provide any real
protection against the erosion of Art. III jurisdiction by the unilateral action of the political
branches." Id.
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well. Justice Brennan proposed two principles with which to judge
whether an adjunct was constitutionally permissible. 129 First, when
Congress creates a substantive federal right, it has broad discretion to
prescribe the manner of its adjudication. However, when Congress
does not create the right, its discretion is much narrower. Because the
rights involved in Marathon Pipeline were state-created, the plurality
found that the congressional attempt to define the manner of their adjudication to be an "unwarranted encroachment" upon the judicial
power of the United States. 30 The bankruptcy courts thus failed this
first test for an adjunct. Second, the functions of an adjunct must be
limited in such a way that the "essential attributes" of the judicial
power are retained in the article III court. Because of the broad grant
of power to the bankruptcy courts, the Bankruptcy Act removed most
of the essential attributes from the article III district courts and vested
them in non-article III bankruptcy courts,' 3 1 and this could not be
32
cured by the right of appellate review by an article III court.'
The plurality thus took a restrictive view of legislative court judicial power. Given the great importance of article III policies and principles, legislative courts are justified only in three narrow cases. The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978's grant of judicial power was unconstitutional because it gave too much power to a legislative court that
could neither fit those exceptions nor guarantee adherence to article III
principles.
The Concurring Opinion
Justice Rehnquist, 33 in concurring with the plurality, made every
effort to avoid the article III judicial power question. Noting that Marathon had simply been named as a defendant in a lawsuit about a con129. The plurality drew these principles from an analysis of Crowell, which upheld the use of
administrative agencies as adjuncts, and United States v. Raddazz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), which
upheld the use of federal magistrates in certain initial trial situations. 102 S.Ct. at 2876-77.
130. 1d. at 2878. Justice Brennan noted: "the case before us ... involves a right created by
state law ... Accordingly, Congress' authority to control the manner in which that right is adjudicated, through assignment of historically judicial functions to a non-Art. II "adjunct", plainly
must be deemed at a minimum." Id.
131. Id. at 2879. Article IIIprinciples are violated when an adjunct, behind the 'facade' of a
grant of jurisdiction to a constitutional court, can exercise traditional article Ill powers. Id.
132. The plurality's view of the adequacy of appellate review is muted in the opinion. In a
footnote, the dissent's arguments about appellate review are simply dismissed as "incorrect". Id.
at 2873 n.28. In a second footnote, the plurality rejects the argument as contrary to the text of the
Constitution, noting that "our precedents make it clear that the constitutional requirements for the
exercise of the judicial power must be met at all stages of adjudication, and not only on appeal
. Id. at 2879, n.39.
133. Justice O'Connor joined in the concurrence.
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tract, and thus had "not [yet] been subjected to the full range of
authority granted the Bankruptcy Courts," Rehnquist believed that
"any objections" Marathon may make as to the exercise of the bankruptcy courts "should await the exercise of such authority."'' 34 Given
the confusion in this particular area of constitutional law, avoidance of
35
any decision on whether article III was violated was encouraged. 1
Nonetheless, Rehnquist offered some view of his theory of legislative court judicial power. Avoiding the "three tidy exceptions" view of
the plurality and the expansive view of the dissent, Rehnquist found
simply that "[nione of the cases has gone so far as to sanction the type
of adjudication to which Marathon will be subjected against its will,"
and thus adjudication of Northern's suit in the bankruptcy courts can37
not be maintained. 36 Nor can appellate review save the 1978 Act.'
Thus, while refusing to make a sweeping statement about legislative
court judicial power, Rehnquist was at least willing to say that a state
right claim is outside the scope of such judicial power.
Chief Justice Burger's Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Burger wrote a separate dissenting opinion to place
special emphasis on the fact that "notwithstanding the plurality opinion, the Court does not hold today that Congress' broad grant of jurisdiction to the new bankruptcy courts is generally inconsistent with
Article III of the Constitution." 38 Burger limited the Court's holding
to Justice Rehnquist's objection: the only impermissible part of the
bankruptcy court's power was its jurisdiction over "state common-law
actions."'139 Thus, the Chief Justice believed that article III's policy
concerns must give way to the judicial power granted the bankruptcy
courts except in the adjudication of state-created rights.
134. 102 S.Ct. at 2882.
135. "Particularly in an area of constitutional law such as that of 'Art. IlI Courts' with its
frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents, rigorous adherence to the principle that
this Court should decide no more of a constitutional question than is absolutely necessary accords
with both our decided cases and with sound judicial policy." Id. at 2881. Earlier in the opinion,
Rehnquist says that "I would with considerable reluctance embark on the duty of deciding this
broad question." Id.
136. Id. at 2881-82.
137. "I am likewise of the opinion that the extent of review by Art. IlI courts provided on
appeal from a decision of the Bankruptcy Court in a case such as Northem's does not save the
grant of authority to the latter under the rule [inCrowel]." Id. at 2882.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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Justice White's Dissenting Opinion
Justice White 40 began his dissent by attacking the cornerstone of
the plurality's decision: the fundamental principle of an independent
judiciary. Noting the historical confusion outlined above, White called
the plurality's claim of an "unambiguous" principle a "gross oversimplification" which puts a "distracting and superficial gloss on a difficult
4
question." '
White believed that the plurality's opinion rested on two grounds:
first, legislative court judges can only hear cases arising out of federal
law, and thus cannot hear a state-law claim; and second, whatever the
source of a right, article III prevents the creation of legislative courts
except in three situations.
The dissent rejected the first ground of the plurality's opinion because the distinction between federal and state rights ignores the true
nature of the bankruptcy proceeding. Bankruptcy has always involved
state claims.' 4 2 Because the referees had effectively assumed control of
the bankruptcy proceedings under the old Act, Justice White believed
that "[ilnitial adjudication of state law issues by non-Article III judges
is . . . hardly a new aspect of the 1978 Act."' 143 Given the provisions
for appeal, the dissenters could not find any reason to declare the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction unconstitutional because of the state claim
involved. 44
In objecting to the second ground of the plurality opinion, Justice
White presented his view of legislative court judicial power. The three
exception view of the plurality was rejected as a series of "non-distinctions." 14 5 After analyzing the historical precedents, White concluded:
"There is no difference in principle between the work that Congress
may assign to an Article I court and that which the Constitution assigns
to Article III courts." 14 6 In short, the jurisdiction and judicial power of
140. The dissent was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell.
141. 102 S. Ct. at 2883.
142. "The crucial point to be made is that in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings the great bulk
of creditor claims are claims that have accrued under state law prior to bankruptcy . . . The
existence and validity of such claims recurringly depends on state law. Hence, the bankruptcy
judge is constantly enmeshed in state law issues." Id. at 2884. See I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
88 (14th ed. 1976).
143. 102 S. Ct. at 2886.
144. Id. Justice White believed that the provisions for appeal under the old and new bankruptcy laws were the same.
145. Id. at 2889.
146. Id. at 2893. Justice White viewed this as a historical result and not as a necessary consequence of constitutional theory: "It is too late . . . to return to the simplicity of the principle
pronounced in Article Ill . . . " Id. He defended this position because of the demand for a
coherent system of constitutional text and precedent.
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legislative courts can be coextensive with that of constitutional courts.
Such extensive legislative court judicial power can exist within the constitutional system because the fundamental policies of article III are not
to be "read out of the Constitution;" rather, they express one value that
must be balanced against competing article I values and the legislative
ends sought in establishing the legislative court. 147 With the Supreme
48
Court retaining the final word on how that balance is to be struck,
and appellate review by article III courts, 49 a proper separation of
powers could be struck and the independence of the judiciary would
thus be insured. Justice White therefore concluded that the broad judicial power granted the bankruptcy courts was constitutionally proper.
ANALYSIS

The inability of any of the four views of legislative court judicial
power to command a majority of the court guarantees that Marathon
Pipeline will add to the-confusion already present in case law on the
subject. That confusion, evident in National Mutual Insurance, 50 as
well as in the congressional debates on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, had left the definition of the limits of that judicial power in
doubt, and possibly "meaningless." The fundamental split between the
plurality and the dissent in Marathon Pipeline, both as to the definition
of those limits and the methodology for defining those limits, leaves a
difficult area of constitutional law that much more difficult.
When attention is focused on the definition of the limits on legislative court judicial power, the plurality correctly points out that the true
issue underlying any such definition is the conflict between the policies
of article III and the historical fact that Congress has been able to create courts not subject to article III.' 5 1 The true difference between the
plurality opinion of the Court and Justice White's dissent is the amount
of importance each is willing to attach to article III's policies.
The plurality finds the policies of article III to be highly important-"fundamental principles" against which the congressional activ147. Id.
148. Justice White does not believe that the Court must simply defer to Congress' decision to
create a legislative court. Rather, the Court must be willing to balance the competing interests
involved.
149. Finding that under the 1978 Act "there is in every instance a right of appeal to at least
one Article III court," id. at 2894, the dissent believed that these provisions for review were sufficient to protect article III interests: "Appellate review of the decisions of legislative courts, like
appellate review of state court decisions, provides a firm check on the ability of the political institutions of government to ignore or transgress constitutional limits on their own authority." Id.
150. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
151. 102 S.Ct. at 2867.
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ity creating a court must be measured. The position taken appears to
be that article III policies are so important to the structure of government that any exercise of judicial power must be carried out by a constitutional court, unless it is in one of the three narrow areas where
Congress has "extraordinary powers" which justify the creation of the
legislative court.
Constitutional history belies such a simple assessment of article
III's importance. In American Insurance Company v. Canter, Chief Justice Marshall did not carve out a small exception to article III for territorial courts; rather, he simply set article III aside in favor of Congress'
enumerated power over the territories. It was later courts which
ascribed to him a sensitivity to the underlying policy concerns of article
111.152 NationalMutual Insurance Company v. Tidewater Transfer Company, despite its confusion, had the result of setting aside the article III
concerns of diversity jurisdiction in favor of Congress' article I power
over the District of Columbia. And in Palmore v. United States, the
Court said directly that article III must sometimes give way to accommodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate in "specialized
areas." ' 53 It is apparent that important, non-article III considerations
are involved in the creation of legislative courts. The dissent is thus
correct in pointing out that calling article III a fundamental principle is
an "oversimplification." Competing constitutional issues are involved,
and article III considerations do not always win out.
Given that there are competing interests involved in the decision
to create a legislative court, there must be some kind of methodology
by which the competing interests can be compared with each other to
resolve the conflict. The dissent correctly points out that what occurs,
in effect, is a balancing test-a weighing of the relative value of article
III policy considerations against the value of the competing, non-article
III considerations. Despite its protests to the contrary,' 54 this is precisely what the plurality does. It assigns great weight to article III policies so that there are only three considerations which could tilt the
balance in favor of a legislative court. The dissent, on the other hand,
views the article III considerations as simply one of several constitutional policy concerns, each of relatively equal weight, which are to be
balanced. 55 Whatever the final value attached to article III, the impor152. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S.
516 (1933).
153. 411 U.S. at 408.
154. See 102 S.Ct. at 2873 n.28.
155. Id. at 2893.
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tance of the dissent is its recognition of the constitutional process which
sets the limits of legislative court judicial power: the balancing of competing constitutional interests.
Applying this balancing process to the creation of the bankruptcy
courts is difficult because of the broad scope of the judicial power that
Congress gave these courts. The plurality is clearly concerned about
the "related to" jurisdiction of the courts--the power to hear claims
"related to" cases arising under the Bankruptcy Code. 156 Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger may be correct in limiting the judicial
power problems to state-created rights, instead of focusing on the justification for the entire grant of judicial power, as the plurality and dissent do. However, it is important that the Court focuses on the broad
question because that focus gives the Court an opportunity to deal with
the issues underlying that judicial power.
The plurality clearly sets out the concerns behind the article III
salary and tenure provisions. Separation of the powers of each branch
of government is important to the operation of the checks and balances
that prevent government from overstepping its constitutional bounds.
The independence of the judiciary is vital to that delicate balance of
power. These policy concerns justify the desire to vest as much judicial
power as possible in judges outside the control of other governmental
branches. In bankruptcy adjudication, this was historically done by
vesting the power to hear such cases in the district court. 157
The inquiry cannot, however, stop there. Competing policy considerations exist which mitigate against the necessity of vesting bankruptcy court judicial power in an article III tribunal. The history of
bankruptcy law, at least after the Chandler Act amendments, indicates
that a shift in judicial power occurred from the article III district court
judges to the non-article III referee/judges. ' 58 Those referees enjoyed
a defacto independence from the district court judges, who willingly
withdrew from bankruptcy litigation because of the increasing specialization needed for adjudicating bankruptcy claims. 59 The only controls
grounded in article III that in fact existed over the referees were (1) the
review of referee judgments by district court judges; (2) the appointment and removal of referees by district court judges; and (3) thepro
156. See supra note 92, and accompanying text.
157. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended by the Chandler Act of 1938, named the district
court as the court of bankruptcy. 52 Stat. 840, § 1. Thus, bankruptcy adjudication took place (at
least in a theoretical sense) within the district court.
158. See supra notes 72-86, and accompanying text.
159. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9.
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forma reality that the bankruptcy proceeding took place in the district
court. 160 In short, non-article III judicial officers had long been making
the judicial decisions of bankruptcy adjudication. The fact that the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 codified this historical fact indicates
that the reform sought by the Act was less a derogation from article III
principles than a recognition that those principles had already given
way in practice to other concerns.
The ability of an independent, article III judge to review bankruptcy court decisions and correct deviations by the non-article III tribunal is another important consideration in the balancing process. The
assumption of article III is that proper judicial decisions are insured
when the judges making those decisions are free from political pressure
and control. The resultant policy is the article III requirement for decisions by independent article III judges, with guaranteed salaries and
tenures. Yet this policy is not exclusively served by these provisions.
The lesson of Crowell is that there are judicial roles that can be filled by
non-article III judges. Even in the determination of "jurisdictional
facts", which require the application of law to fact, 16 ' legislative court
judges can make such determinations without violating article III provided the district court can review the decision on appeal.' 62 In attempting to argue that appellate review is an inadequate protection of
article III, the plurality misreads Crowel?' 63 and thus rests its entire argument on the fact that the formal requirements of salary and tenure
65
protection are not met.t 64 But that is to exalt form over substance.
160. See 52 Stat. 840, § 34.
161. See supra notes 47-48. According to the Court's definition and analysis of "jurisdictional
facts", whenever a deputy commissioner made a finding that damages were to be awarded, he in
effect said that the relationship of master and servant existed and that the injury occurred on the
navigable waters of the United States-which is applying these legal concepts (defined by statute)
to the factual situation of the case before him.
162. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
163. In its footnote analysis of the appellate review argument (102 S. Ct. at 2879 n.39), the
plurality quotes a passage from Crowell as proof that the Crowell Court rejected the suggestion
that article Ill is satisfied so long as some degree of appellate review is provided:
[to accept such a regime] would be to sap the judicial power as it exists under the Federal
Constitution, and to establish a government of a bureaucratic character alien to our system . . .
285 U.S. at 57. Yet that passage was addressed to the suggestion that an administrative agency's
finding could be final and not reviewable. Id. Crowell in fact stands for the proposition that
appellate review can maintain "the essential independence of the exercise of the judicial power of
the United States." Id. at 64.
164. See 102 S. Ct. at 2873 n.28. See also Krattenmaker,supra note 105 at 306-307;Article III
Limits, supra note 16.
165. While it is true that the salary and tenure provisions are a "structural protection provision" (Krattenmaker, supra note 105, at 306), it is also true that the values protected by these
provisions are not absolute. They have given way to other policy considerations in territorial
courts, military courts, the use of state courts for adjudication of federal rights-indeed, in all of
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As the dissent suggests, appellate review can insure that the policies of
article III are served by allowing an article III tribunal to correct the
mistakes wrought by the legislative court. 166 Unless the Court suddenly now requires that a litigant be given the right to an initial adjudication by an article III tribunal, a position expressly rejected by the
16 7
Court,
the dissent is correct in concluding that appellate review
serves to reduce the possible damage to article III policy considerations
caused by granting the bankruptcy courts their judicial power.
In the balancing of these competing interests, the concerns of article III, while important, appear protected by appellate review. The historical fact that article III has given way to the considerations which
prompted a shift in judicial power to the referees is further evidence
that the legislative court policy concerns tend to outweigh article III
concerns. Given these factors, the legislative court judicial power
granted the bankruptcy courts is constitutionally justified because the
policies in favor of that power outweigh the concerns of article III. The
decision of the Court in Marathon Ppeline thus represents a mistake in
judicial judgment.
Finally, Marathon Pipeline will have a serious impact on future
congressional attempts to create legislative courts. The principal advantage that legislative courts offer to Congress is their practical flexibility' 6 8-- Congress need not create permanent judgeships or remain
limited by the subject matter jurisdiction restrictions of article III. After Marathon Ppeline, Congress' choices will not include legislative
courts unless the court that Congress wants to create falls within the
three narrow situations outlined by the plurality. The legislative process of delegating judicial power essentially becomes a checklist procedure (does the court fall under one of the three permissible categories?)
instead of the weighing of practical policy alternatives available when
the legislative courts upheld by the Court. It is surely possible to consider whether those protections will exist in a legislative court as one value in the balancing process, but to require adherence
to the article IllI requirements when the values they protect are protected under the legislative
court scheme is to ignore historical precedent and to emphasize the structural manifestation of
those values over the values themselves.
166. . . . Crowell suggests that the presence of appellate review by an Article Ill court
will go a long way toward insuring a proper separation of powers. Appellate review of
the decisions of legislative courts, like appellate review of state court decisions, provides
a firm check on the ability of the political institutions of government to ignore or transgress constitutional limits on their own authority.
102 S.Ct. at 2894.
167. Palmore v. United States directly rejected the claim that a criminal defendant tried under
a law of the United States (and thus within article Ill jurisdiction) is guaranteed a right to a
hearing before an article Ill judge. No such right existed "in either constitutional text or in constitutional history and practice." 411 U.S. at 400.
168. See supra note 22.
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creating frameworks for adjudication. Given the narrowness of the
three categories, Congress will not be able to create many new legislative courts. Delegation of new jurisdiction or judicial power will fall
either on the already-burdened district courts, or on new article III
tribunals which will be burdened by the costs of life-tenured judges
who enjoy guaranteed salaries. By effectively stripping Congress of the
legislative court option, Marathon Pipeline may well force new
problems on the existing constitutional court judiciary.
CONCLUSION

The salary and tenure provisions of article III reflect an underlying
policy of preserving the independence of the judiciary created under
the Constitution, thus preserving proper separation of powers between
the branches of government. However, these policies have historically
given way to other constitutional or governmental concerns, thus permitting the creation of non-article III legislative courts. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 tested the limits on the judicial power of
legislative courts when that power intrudes upon the policy concerns of
article III. Marathon Pipeline declares the Bankruptcy Reform Act's
intrusion unconstitutional, although it does so in a confusing way
which guarantees to continue the confusion already existing in the current understanding of the limits of legislative court judicial power. The
plurality opinion of the Court fails to recognize the competing interests
and appellate review protections that tend to outweigh the policy considerations of article III. If Marathon Pipeline is to be relied upon as a
precedent, it should be remembered for the recognition, in dissent, that
the process of determining the limits of legislative court judicial power
is a balancing of the competing interests involved. It is only in balancing relevant issues, such as the policy concerns of article III, the historical defacto independence of bankruptcy judges, and the protections
provided by appellate review, that Congress and the courts can be assured that all such policy considerations are examined and a workable
framework for adjudicating a legal problem is established. By ignoring
this balancing process, the MarathonPipeline court denied Congress an
effective legislative alternative and limited Congress' flexibility when
establishing new courts.

